The Mind Brain Identity Theory - 1096 Words

Many arguments in the philosophy of the mind have been made for and against, whether or not the mind and the brain are the same entity. The mind-brain identity theory is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states (Mandik 77). Therefore, we can identify sensations and other mental processes with physical brain processes (Blutner 4). I argue, that the mind is not identical to the brain, and the conceivable idea of zombies, as well as the multiple realizability argument, can disprove this theory. In denying that the mind and mental properties, like qualia, are nonphysical things, mind-brain theory objects to both substance and property dualism. Therefore it is a physicalist approach to the philosophy of†¦show more content†¦By definition there’s ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie (Kirk). For example, if we place a yellow ball in front of a zombie and a normal person, they both acknowledge that it is a ball and it is yellow. However, the normal person will have a deeper sensory connection to it; they â€Å"experience† what it is like to see the yellow and to know it is a ball. Whereas the zombie just observes it to be a yellow ball; it does not have any sort of sensory experience related to the ball. It is said in philosophy, that if something is conceivable, than it is possible (87). It is possible to conceive a zombie while acknowledging that it shares the same physical, brain and neural characteristics as a human. This is where zombies help to disprove the mind-brain identity theory. Zombies are conceivable, therefore possible. So, if it is possible to have properly functioning neural properties without qualia, then identity theory is false. The theory cannot effectively account for qualia since it considers it to be a physical property, more specifically, a property of the brain. In the 1960’s, Hilary Putnam introduced the world of philosophy to the multiple realizability argument agai nst identity theory. Her main point in her argument was that, if identity theory holds to be true, than all living creatures who experience pain, such as humans, mammals, reptiles, etc., must have a commonly shared physical-chemical brain state which directly relates to a certain mental